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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j)
Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN A FENCE AS A BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS BELIEVED THAT
THE FENCE WAS A BOUNDARY WHICH INCLUDED TWO ACRES
OF THE DEFENDANT'S DESCRIBED PROPERTY WHERE THE TRIAL
COURT MADE NO FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT SHARED
THAT BELIEF?
Standard of Review: Whether a given set of facts gives rise to a
determination of acquiescence is reviewable as a matter of law, however with some
measure of discretion accorded the trial court. Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah
App. 2005).
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT ACQUIESCENCE WAS SHOWN BY THE
UNILATERAL TESTIMONY AND BELIEF OF SOME OF THE
PLAINTIFFS THAT THE FENCE CONSTITUTED THE BOUNDARY
WHERE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF RECORD PLAINLY DISCLOSED
THE TWO ACRES OF THE DEFENDANTS PROJECTING INTO THE
PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL DESCRIPTION?
Standard of Review: Whether a given set of facts gives rise to a
determination of acquiescence is reviewable as a matter of law, however with some
measure of discretion accorded the trial court. Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah
App. 2005); Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App.
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1999) (Both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary
line.)
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPUTE
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RECORD DESCRIPTIONS TO
NEGATE PLAINTIFFS' ASSERTED BELIEF THAT THE FENCE WAS
THE BOUNDARY?
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness in
interpreting a statute. Sachs v. Lesser, 163 P.3d 662, 673 (Utah App. 2007); Utah
Code Annotated § 57-4a-2.
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OMITTING FINDINGS
BASED UPON RECORD TITLES SHOWN BY EXHIBITS RECEIVED IN
EVIDENCE?
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's findings based on
written materials, the Court of Appeals is in as good a position as the trial court to
examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts and conclusions. Matter of
Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988); Bench v.
Bechtel Civil & Minerals Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah App. 1988).
E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF FACT?
Standard of Review: The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings
of fact, but grants no deference to the district court's conclusions of law. Low v.
City ofMonticello, 103 P.3d 130, 133 (Utah 2004); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,
1241 (Utah 1998).
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F. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS PRETRIAL PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ADUDICATION THAT SILENCE ALONE IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE ACQUIESCENCE IF THE DEFENDANT
ALSO TREATED THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY INSTEAD OF A
BARRIER AND LIMITING THE ISSUE FOR TRIAL AS BEING
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT TREATED THE FENCE AS A
BOUNDARY OR AS A BARRIER UNDER UTAH'S DOCTRINE OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE?
Standard of Review: Summary Judgment is a conclusion of law and no
deference is given to the trial court's conclusions of law. Park West Condominium
Ass'n. Inc. v. Deppe, 153 P.3d 821, 824 (Utah App. 2006).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Plaintiffs are four children of William Howard Smith, who through his
created entities transferred a 104.87 acre tract of pasture land to his four children
who then created four separate trusts to take title to a one-fourth interest to each
trust with each child being named as Trustee of the child's trust. All of said 104.87
acres are situated in Section 22 Township 2 North Range 1 West.
The defendant has owned 65 acres of which, 63 acres are in Section 23 east
of Section 22, and two acres are in Section 22 projecting into and surrounded on
three sides by the plaintiffs' property. A fence along the section line between
Sections 22 and 23 existed prior to 1949 and was maintained by parties on each side
of the fence to contain their respective cattle. The defendants' two acres in Section
22 was not separately fenced and was used by the plaintiffs and predecessors for
3

ditches and grazing.
The trial court entered judgment and decree quieting title to the two acres of
the defendants to the plaintiffs after finding a boundary by acquiescence.
B. Course of Proceedings.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 20, 2006 alleging a recent survey
revealed to them that the fence was not on the recorded boundary and that the fence
became a boundary by acquiescence.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment based upon an affidavit of
one of the plaintiffs, Cindy S. Hatch, that the only issue remaining for trial would be
whether the defendant treated the fence as a boundary or as a barrier under Utah's
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
A bench trial on the reserved issue was held June 5, 2008, and the court made
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 5, 2008. A judgment was
entered quieting title on September 8, 2008.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We recite the Findings of fact of the trial court as being supported by the
evidence. However there are other undisputed facts in admitted exhibits upon
which the court did not make findings. The eleven paragraphs of Findings of Fact
are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT #1-11
(R-359-362)
4

1. The plaintiffs and the defendants are neighbors. The plaintiffs' property
is located west of the defendants' property.
2. There has been a barbed wire fence on the east side of the plaintiffs' land
since at least 1964. In fact, it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence
is in the same location that it has been since 1949.
3. That fence is the boundary between the plaintiffs' property and a number
of other properties owned by different individuals. The fence follows a straight, or
nearly straight, course. The fence follows the record boundaries, with one
exception. In one portion of the fence line, the fence line does not follow the record
boundary. Instead, the fence continues in a straight line and cuts off a two-acre
parcel that is recorded as belonging to the defendants. That parcel ("the Parcel") is
the basis the dispute between the parties.
4. Both parties helped maintain the fence.
5. The plaintiffs' property was passed down through inheritance to the
current owners. The plaintiffs took possession of the property in 1978. All of the
plaintiffs and their predecessors used the Parcel for farming and grazing. The
plaintiffs were never told not to use the Parcel, and the plaintiffs were never
informed that the Parcel belonged to the defendants. The defendants have not used
the Parcel for any purpose, and individuals who leased the defendants' property
likewise did not use the Parcel for any purpose.
5

6. The plaintiffs have always believed that the fence is the boundary between
their property and the defendants' property.
7. Both parties have grazed cattle on their respective properties.
8. There are two ditches that follow different portions of the fence. All
ditches are located on the west side of the fence, and are thus on the plaintiffs' side
of the fence.
9. The ditch that follows the portion of the fence that borders the Parcel is
the Smith drain. There were some allegations during the litigation of the motion for
summary judgment that the fence might have served as a barrier to livestock, and
that the fence kept the cattle out of the drain ditch. However, the fence is only on
one side of the ditch. As noted above, both parties ran cattle on their respective
properties. Thus, the fence did keep the defendants' cattle out of the Smith drain,
but there was no fence to keep the plaintiffs' cattle out of the Smith drain. In fact,
Scott Smith testified that the plaintiffs use the Smith drain to help water their cattle.
Thus, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was required to
keep cattle from entering the ditch.
10. Mack Smith is the grandson of William R. Smith, who purchased the
property that now belongs to the plaintiffs. Mack Smith testified that the Smith
drain was dug after the fence was constructed, and the digging of the drain had no
effect on the location of the fence.

6

11. Marvin George testified that in approximately 1965, he, his father, and
another gentleman were working on the fence, and had a discussion with one of the
plaintiffs' predecessors. Marvin George testified that the substance of the
conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants' property,
were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the Parcel). There
was no testimony given that showed that any of the plaintiffs knew of this
conversation, and there is not testimony given that the plaintiffs knew after 1978
that the Parcel was actually the defendants' property. (End of court's Findings of
Fact).
Additional undisputed facts are contained in the exhibits included in the
addendum to this brief.
As shown on pages 108-111 of the transcript of trial, the defendants' counsel
reviewed Exhibit JT17 which is a patent from the United States of America to Heber
C. Wood describing the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 22 which is an
80 acre parcel which includes a four acre tract, the north two acres of which is in the
defendants' recorded description and the south two acres became part of the
plaintiffs recorded description.
In that same year, 1883, the said Heber C. Wood deeded the south half of the
southeast quarter of Section 22 excepting the four acres lying and situated in the
northeast corner of said south half of the Southeast quarter of Section 22, which
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four acres later became divided into two acres on the north for the defendants and
two acres on the south for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs received their two acres as
part of a seven acre tract, five of which are in Section 23 and two of which are in
Section 22, in 1949 as shown by Plaintiffs Exhibits 23, 24 and 25. (R 350). The
two acre tract of the defendant came in a deed in 1951, as part of a described 6.366
acre tract, 4.636 of which are in Section 23 and two acres are in Section 22.
The fence line along the section line was never changed to conform to the
subsequent division of the four acre tract and later to two, two-acre tracts and as
such was never a boundary for any conveyances.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fence which is claimed by the Smith family to be a boundary line by
acquiescence was found by the court to be in the same location that is has been since
1949 (the year plaintiffs' grandfather acquired the tract along with hundreds of acres
adjoining thereto). The only plaintiff to testify was Mack Smith who said that there
was an old fence existing in 1949 which Smiths reconstructed in the same location
along the section line.
Prior to 1883, the property on both sides of the fence was owned by Heber C.
Wood, who in 1884 deeded four acres in Section 222 to Jacob Gierisch. These four
acres eventually were divided into two acre parcels. The South going to Smiths in
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1949 in a description of a 7.545 acre tract of which 5.545 acres were in Section 23
east of the fence line and 2.0 acres were west of the section line in Section 222,
having dimensions of 231 feet east to west and 379.6 feet north to south.
The two acres of Security Investment (Stahle), defendant were acquired in
1951 from Luvena Winegar along with other acreage in Section 23. One description
in the Winegar deed is that of 6.636 acres, 4.636 of which are in Section 23 and two
acres are in Section 22 projecting into the Smith farm wit dimensions of 231 feet
east to west and 379.6 feet north to south.
Accordingly, the fence along the section line which was old as of 1949, was
not a boundary to either the two acre tract of Security, nor to the two acre tract of
Smith to the south thereof.
The trial court entered partial summary judgment limiting the issue for trial
stating: "Therefore, the only remaining issue for trial is whether defendant treated
the fence as a boundary or as a barrier under Utah's doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence." (R192). There is no finding of the trial court that the "defendant"
treated the fence as a boundary, and only recited facts relating to the use of the fence
as a barrier to contain cattle of both parties. The court did find that Marvin George,
of the George family which leased the defendants' property form 1965 to the time of
trial knew that they were paying to lease two acres of Security's property which they
were not using. Marvin George was subpoenaed by the plaintiffs and testified as a
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witness for the plaintiff, and he testified that the reason they did not farm the two
acres was "it wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture." (Tr
68).
If the trial court were correct in limiting the issue for trial to whether the
defendants treated the fence as a barrier or a boundary, then that issue should have
been resolved in favor of the defendant that the fence was only treated as a barrier.
Because Marvin George was called by the plaintiffs to testify as their witness, they
are vouching for his testimony and veracity. State v. Burke, 129 P.2d 560, 562
(Utah 1942); Schlatter v. McCarthy, 196 P.2d 968, 975 (Utah 1948).
Use alone is not evidence of acquiescence. Knowledge of the true boundary
defeats a claim in acquiescence. Keith Stahle, the founder of Security was an
attorney and the attorney who represented the plaintiffs' grandfather in the 1949
purchase where in Stahle supplied an opinion of title.
Mack Smith was asked if he knew Keith Stahle (Staley) and testified:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

Did you know Keith Stahle?
I knew who he was.
Did you know his relationship with you father?
Only that they all grew up in Bountiful.
Did you know that he ever represented you grandfather?
Keith Stahle?
Yes.
I don't recall one way or the other.

The trial court should not have accepted the affidavit of Cindy Hatch as
10

being sufficient for its partial summary judgment limiting the issue at trial. Her
affidavit was unsubstantiated opinion, conjecture and belief.
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does
anything about it for a long period of time will not establish it as a true boundary
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
Occupation up to a fence without interference is not sufficient to establish
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
Both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as a boundary
and recognition and acquiescence must be mutual. Defendant knew that the line
was not a boundary. None of the plaintiffs had knowledge of the fence being a
boundary, and at most supposed or mistakenly believed it to be. The fence was used
as a barrier for cattle and was never an ownership boundary. All references in
recorded documents are descriptions tied to section monuments with no reference to
any fence, until the Judgment dated September 14, 2008, described the boundary
with reference to a fence along several courses and distances.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT
THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN A FENCE
AS A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IN FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS BELIEVED THAT THE FENCE
WAS A BOUNDARY WHICH INCLUDED TWO ACRES
OF THE DEFENDANT'S DESCRIBED PROPERTY
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT SHARED THAT BELIEF.
11

The trial court's finding in Par. 6 that "the plaintiffs have always believed
that the fence is the boundary between their property and the defendants' property"
is supported by an affidavit of Cindy S. Hatch and the trial testimony of Mack
Smith, who are two of the four plaintiffs. The other two plaintiffs did not testify,
nor was there direct evidence of their beliefs. Thus if mistaken belief constitutes
acquiescence, then only two of the four owners are on record as so believing.
Cindy S. Hatch's affidavit is dated September 4, 2007 and supplied in
support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. After stating that she is a
registered certified public accountant licensed with the state of Utah, the relevant
portions of the affidavit are: (R-311)
2. Since 1978,1, along with my three brother, have had an interest in
my family's farm located in Davis County, Utah, which is referred to as the
Smith Parcel in the above-captioned lawsuit and is more particularly
described as follows: [a full legal description follows which shows the
exclusion of the defendants' two acre tract of 231 feet east to west and
379.60 feet north to south]
3. Since at least 1978,1 have observed our family use the Smith
Parcel for the raising of hay and for grazing of livestock.
4. Since 1978,1 have believed that the East boundary of the Smith
Parcel is located in the place of barbed wire fence that currently exists as
depicted in the survey attached hereto as Exhibit 1. I know that the barbed
wire fence has existed in its present location as depicted on the survey since
at least 1978.
5. Just before this lawsuit was filed, I learned that the fence does not
strictly follow the boundary of the Smith Parcel, but instead follows a path
that leaves some property to which Security claims to have record title.
12

6. Before obtaining the survey attached in the Exhibit 1,1 had not
known that the legal description for the parcel of land owned by Security
Investment Ltd. crosses the barbed wire fence along the East boundary of the
Smith Parcel.
7. The fence has been treated by me and our family as the boundary
between the Smith Parcel and all of the property owner to the East, including
Security, since at least 1978.
8. I have never seen anyone use any of the property on our side of the
fence other than our family. Specifically, I have never observed nor been
told that Security or anyone affiliated with Security, has ever used any
portion of the property on our side of the fence. In fact, our family has
consistently, and without interruption, used all of the property on our side of
the fence, including the area Security now claims belongs to it in the abovecaptioned lawsuit. Our family's use has included improving the soil, running
livestock, planting and cutting hay and other farm related uses.
9. The barbed wire fence is the boundary between the Smith Parcel
and the adjoining property owned by Security and has been since at least
1978.
Cindy's affidavit does not state what the other three plaintiffs believed,
however she indicates that she and her family treated the fence as a boundary.
The only plaintiff to testify was Mack Smith whose testimony relative to his
belief of the boundary is the following excerpts from the transcript:
Q
Okay. What have you considered to be the boundary between your
farm and the Security Investment parcel or the Staley parcel as it is often
been referred to?
A
This fence.
(TR 79). Regarding the fence:
Q
And you're saying that that [ditch] was dug after the fence was located
in its current location?
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A
We never, ever - the fence was always there from the time we bought
the farm and we dug the drain ditch, we moved west of it and the integrity of
the fence was never affected by the digging of the drain ditch.
(TR 79-80).
Q
And in your recollection does the fence run relatively straight
considering it had (inaudible) and everything from that point south?
A

It does.

Q

And who was the owner of this parcel?

A

We owned that. It was part of the Smith Farm.

Q

Who were the owners of it?

A
At that time, at the time we bought it was W. R. Smith, my
grandfather.
Q
Okay. And at some point in time you became aware of the Security
Investment or Staleys owning a parcel. Would you please show for us in a
different color, maybe orange color where you believe the Security parcels
come into your fence line?
A
Well, this is going to sound very ridiculous but this is my recollection.
I was at the courthouse looking up—
Q

Just over here where this Security parcel is.

A
This is their parcel hereon up. And I was in the courthouse doing
something, I think probably looking at the right-of-way on the Gun Club
Road and my memory told me there was two acres out here in our property
that belonged to the Staleys.
Q

And when did you become aware of that?

A.
Pretty vague on that, maybe 15 years ago or something, I don't know.
I couldn't imagine why John Staley as an attorney would have taken two
acres out in the farm so when I learned recently with this dispute that it
14

attached to their property, I went over to the courthouse to see if I was crazy
and it turns out I was.
Q
Well, during the time period that's at issue here, did you know any
other boundary other than that blue line?
A

Never have ever known any other boundary.

(TR81).
If 15 years ago he was looking at the right of way or the Gun Club Road, he
knew that "there was two acres out here in our property that belonged to Staleys,"
that would be in 1993, when he had actual knowledge of the Staley's two acres.
The alleged twenty-year period was claimed as being form 1978 to 1998. Mack's
belief did not continue for twenty years, only five years.
Assuming that one's belief is synonymous with acquiescence, we consider
the effect of a unilateral mistaken belief.
In Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951), the Court held (quoting
from Holmes v. Judge, 312 Utah 269):
"We do not wish to be understood as holding that the parties may not claim
to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary is located
through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is clear that the line as located
was not intended as a boundary, and where a boundary so located has not
been acquiesced in for a long term of years by the parties in interest."
Cindy was mistaken as to the fence being a boundary and her mistaken belief should
not deprive the defendant who was not mistaken.
The Brown v. Mulliner court also held that a fence erected at a time land on
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both sides of the fence was owned by the same person the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence was inapplicable:
In Home Owners5 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, supra, there was evidence
that a fence line, which it was contended had long been acquiesced in as the
boundary, had been erected at a time when the land on both sides of the fence
was owned by the same person; in Peterson v. Johnson, it was proved that the
fence in question had been erected when the property on one side thereof was
part of the public domain; and in Glenn v. Whitney, supra, a fence, urged to
be a long-recognized boundary, was shown by the evidence to have been
erected by a person who never owned the property on either side of the fence.
In all three of these cases this court held that the doctrine of boundary of
acquiescence was not applicable because in view of the evidence there was
no room for any implication that the fence line had been erected by adjoining
owners pursuant to an agreement between them as to the location of the
boundary between them.
Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951).
In Brown v. Mulliner, it was also stated that a person is presumed to claim
title to the land called for by his deed.
The fact that a landowner allows others to share with him the use of his land
does not necessarily signify a disclaimer of ownership. And this is perhaps
ever more true when, as in the instant case the location of the true boundary
does not appear to have been known to he adjoining owners. A person
should be presumed to claim title to all the land called for by his deed unless
it clearly appears otherwise.
Id. at 208.
There do not appear to have been appellate decisions on the relationship
between "belief and acquiescence. Even assuming the relevance of "belief," a
determination of a person's belief is not readily provable. Should the test of
"belief be a subjective one, or the objective test of a reasonable person under the
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circumstances? An objective test would require a person to make substantial
investigation or inquiry to support a belief.
The California District Court of Appeal case of Rast v. Fischer, 236 P.2d
393, 395 (1951) stated that:
[1]
Thus we have at the outset a situation in which there was no disputed
boundary, but a mistake as to the true boundary by the parties concerned. As
was said in Pedersen v. Reynolds, 31 Cal.App.2d 18, 28, 87 P.2d 51, quoting
from 4 Thompson on Real Property, page 210, section 3115, "An agreement
or acquiescence in a wrong boundary when the true boundary is known, or
can be ascertained from the deed, is treated both in law and equity as a
mistake, and neither party is estopped from claiming the true line."
The part of the quotation "or can be ascertained from the deed" suggests that an
examination of the deed description is at least an important element of an objective
test as evidence of "belief."
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252
(Utah App. 2006) precludes a determination of boundary by acquiescence where
only one party recognizes a fence as a boundary in stating that:
Although acquiescence in a boundary line may occur through a party's
silence or failure to object and does not require an explicit agreement,
"recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must have
knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary line." Argyle v. Jones,
2005 UT App 346, ^| 11,118 P.3d 301 (emphasis added) (alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).
[12-14] f 16 In the instant matter, although the Browns subjectively
believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually
communicated their belief to Jorgensen, either by word or action. Therefore,
there was no "actual acknowledgement... that the parties treat the [F]ence as
the common boundary." Moreover, "'[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to
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be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time
will not establish it as the true boundary.5" Argyle, 2005 UT App 346 at Hl35
118 P.3d 301 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah
267, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2 556, 559
(Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiffs occupation to the fence without interference was
not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a
boundary.").
Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d at 1257.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT ACQUIESCENCE WAS SHOWN
BY THE UNILATERAL TESTIMONY AND BELIEF OF
SOME OF THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THE FENCE
CONSTITUTED THE BOUNDARY WHERE LEGAL
DESCRIPTIONS OF RECORD PLAINLY DISCLOSED
THE TWO ACRES OF THE DEFENDANTS
PROJECTING INTO THE PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL
DESCRIPTION.
As quoted from Brown v. Jorgensen, "recognition and acquiescence must be
mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the]
boundary line." Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d at 1257.
The trial court made no finding that the defendant recognized and acquiesced
in the fence line as a boundary, and in fact the court in its Findings of Fact,
paragraph 11, refers to the testimony of Marvin George, who with his father, was
leasing the defendants5 65 acres for pasturing cattle and were actually paying for
two acres that they were not using. This testimony and finding clearly negate any
"mutual" recognition or acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Marv George was
subpoenaed by Plaintiffs to testify. At page 68 of the transcript, his testimony was:
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Q
Mr. George, you were leasing 65 acres. Why didn't you farm any of
the portion of the two acres west of the fence?
A It wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
IMPUTE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RECORD
DESCRIPTIONS TO NEGATE PLAINTIFFS'
ASSERTED BELIEF THAT THE FENCE WAS THE
BOUNDARY.
The Plaintiffs are bound by actual notice and by constructive notice by
statute. Utah Code Annotated § 57-4a-2 provides:
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects.
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any
defect, irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or
acknowledgment. A certified copy of a recorded document is admissible as
evidence to the same extent the original document would be admissible as
evidence.
The plaintiffs' complaint sets forth the recorded legal description which
excludes the defendants5 231 feet by 379.60 feet in Section 22. (R2) The same
description is repeated in a deed by Plaintiffs' father and mother to "Alkali Limited"
a partnership in which plaintiffs were partners, recorded October 20, 1978, in Book
734, page 628, in the office of the Davis County recorded as shown by JT Exhibit
11 admitted into evidence.
The same description was repeated in a Quit Claim Deed made by Alkali
Limited by its partners, William R. Smith, Mack G. Smith, John Lynn Smith and
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Cindy Smith Hatch to BMJC, L.L.C. recorded May 4, 1999 as shown by JT Exhibit
12.
There was a subsequent conveyance by BMJC to the four trusts of the
plaintiffs with an identical description dated June 7, 2001.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Universal CI. T. Corporation v.
Courtesy Motors, 8 Utah 2d 275 (Utah 1959), stated first that "it is not claimed that
under the Colorado statutes this recordation was effective for giving constructive
notice," and then held:
As stated by this court in McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d
188, at page 293 in requoting with approval from Wood v. Carpenter, 101
U.S. 135 at page 141, 25 L.Ed. 807:
"'Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall
be deemed conversant of it.'"
Id. at 278.
Accordingly, the actual notice of content of the deeds, and constructive
notice, should eliminate the plaintiffs' belief claims and should constitute
knowledge which controverts the claim of boundary by acquiescence.
Failure to read the content of a contract is no defense and the came principle
should apply in failure to read the deed descriptions. In the case of Garff Realty Co.
v. Better Buildings, 234 P.2d 842 (Utah 1951), the Supreme Court quoted from 12
Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 137:
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The governing rule is thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., contracts, sec. 137, pp. 62829: Ignorance of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily affect the
liability of one who signs it. * * * If a man acts negligently and in such a way
as to justify others in supposing that the writing is assented to by him he will
be bound both at law and in equity, even though he supposes the writing is an
instrument of an entirely different character. The courts appear to be
unanimous in holding that a person who, having the capacity and an
opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its contents and who
sustains no confidential relationship to the other part cannot avoid the
contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at least in
the absence of special circumstances excusing his failure to read it. If the
contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby.
* * * To permit a party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that he
signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him
to admit that he signed it but did not read it or know its stipulations would
absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. The purpose of the rule is to
give stability to written agreements and to remove the temptation and
possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence were
admissible.
Garff Realty Co., 234 P.2d at 844. Also, Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, Section 225
is to the same effect.
POINT IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OMITTING FINDINGS
BASED UPON RECORD TITLES SHOWN BY
EXHIBITS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.
The trial court made no findings based upon record titles as contained in
Exhibits admitted in evidence. These exhibits of recorded documents are attached
in the addendum and can be determined by this Court to show that the fence was
never erected as a boundary. The exhibits in the addendum were admitted by
stipulation. (Tr. 107).
Exhibit JT 17 is a patent from the united States to Heber C. Wood in 1883,
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which describes the South half of the South East Quarter of the South Section
twenty-two containing 80 acres. The two acres of the defendant, Security, and the
Smith property in dispute are within said 80 acres.
This patent was followed by a deed (Exhibit JT 18) in 1883 from Heber C.
Wood to Jacob Gierisch, conveying the 80 acre tract "except four acres lying and
situate in the Southeast corner of the said South half of the South East Quarter of
Section No. 22, T 2 R 1 W." The south two acres of said four acres now are owned
of record by the plaintiffs and the north two acres are owned of record by the
defendant. Accordingly as of 1883, a fence along the section line between Sections
23 on the east and Section 22 on the west was no longer a boundary of the four
acres.
In 1901, Heber C. Wood deeded the four acres to Jacob Gierisch as shown by
Exhibit JT 19.
In 1913, Jacob Gierisch, by Warranty Deed (Exhibit JT 20) deeded in
separate descriptions the four acre tract and the 76 acre tract to Ancel Hatch.
Ancel Hatch in 1945 executed a Sale Agreement (Exhibit JT 22) with
William Guffy for several parcels, one of which is the two acre parcel of the four
acre parcel now owned of record by Plainitiffs.
The trial court's Findings of Fact, paragraph 2 (R 360), stated: "There has
been a barbed wire fence on the east side of plaintiffs' land since at least 1964. In
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fact it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence is in the same location
that it has been since 1949."
Mack Smith, one of the plaintiffs and the only plaintiff to testify at trial,
recalled that in 1949 or 1950, an old fence was in existence. On direct examination,
Mack Smith testified as follows: (Tr 78-79).
Q
Now you've identified a fence. Is the fence that you're talking about
in the same location as the fence that's there today?
A

It is.

Q

And approximately what time was this?

A
It would have been in '49 or '50, right after we bought it. We
gathered up the old wood fence.
Q
And when you were gathering up the old wood fence, was there a
fence already there, is that what you just said?
A
It was a very crude, barbed wire fence. They used tree limbs for fence
posts, etc. but it was there.
Q
So I imagine that you observed that fence be repaired or participated;
is that correct?
A

I have.

Q
And would you describe that for us? How have you participated in
repairing that fence.
A
Just the general fence repair, you go along and check the posts and
staple and if there's wire missing you replace it and...
Q
In connection with that have you ever seen the fence move any more
than just a few - 1 mean, can you describe for us whether it's been moved?
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A

It's where it's always been.

The trial court's conclusion that the fence was to serve as a boundary and a
second purpose to serve as a barrier to keep cattle on the property is not consistent
with the testimony that an old fence in 1949 was reconstructed which was described
as a very crude, barbed wire fence using tree limbs for fence posts, and the fence is
in the same location that the one is today. That old fence was never a boundary to
the four acres which were separated off from the 80 acres starting in 1893, and was
never a boundairy to the two acres of the defendant, nor the two acres of the plaintiff
of that four acres in several conveyances after 1893 and subsequent conveyances
described in JT Exhibits 11 through 27.
POINT V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT,

The trial court concluded there was mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, however, only one plaintiff, Mack, testified concerning his belief that the
fence was a boundary, although in 1993 he had seen the plat at the recorder's office
and said "my memory told me there was two acres out here in our property that
belonged to the Staleys." R82.
Cindy S. Hatch's affidavit stated she believed the fence was the boundary in
that she had never seen anyone other than her family using the property west of the
fence line.

JT Exhibit 14 are photocopies of photos depicting the fence line area
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which is overgrown with trees and vegetation unrelated to farming or occupation up
to the fence which is obscured by the growth.
Scott Smith, a son of the plaintiff, William R. Smith, testified that he took
over running the Smith Farm in 1986. (Tr 24). Scott testified that there was a
drainage ditch west of the fence and an irrigation ditch about 50 feet west of the
fence which was used to irrigate the pasture, although the cattle grazed the area
between the fence and the irrigation ditch. (Tr 51).
Cindy Hatch could not have observed anyone occupying the land between the
irrigation ditch and the fence line and her affidavit states that since 1978 she
observed her family use the Smith parcel for raising of hay and for grazing of
livestock (Tr 167) and that the family's use included improving the soil, running
livestock, planting and cutting hay and other farm related uses (Tr 168). It appears
that the 50 feet east of the irrigation ditch could only be used by cattle assuming that
the cattle were attracted to the overgrown area 59 feet west of the fence and is the
only evidence of "occupation up to a visible line."
There was no evidence of any acquiescence by the defendant in the fence as a
boundary.
The trial court, in paragraph 11 of the findings, recognized the testimony of
Marvin George in 1965 while he and his father were working on the fence there was
a discussion with one of the plaintiffs' predecessors where "the substance of the
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conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants' property,
were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the parcel)." The
court also stated in that paragraph 11 that there was no testimony given that the
plaintiffs knew of this conversation, and there was no testimony given that the
plaintiffs knew after 1978 that the parcel was actually the defendants5 property (R
362). Marvin George also testified as to why he didn't farm the two acres: (Tr 68)
Q
Mr. George, you were leasing 65 acres. Why didn't you farm any of
the portion of the two acres west of the fence?
A
It wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture.
This Court has held in the case of Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah App.
2005):
The narrow issue presented is whether the failure of the Joneses to object to
the forty-year occupation of the disputed property by Roger Argyle and his
predecessors is sufficient to establish acquiescence. Whether a landowner's
inaction alone is sufficient to establish acquiescence was discussed in Glen v.
Whiney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949). In Glen, the Utah Supreme
Court specifically held that "[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to be put up
and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time will not
establish it as the true boundary." 209 P.2d at 260; see also Hales v. Frakes,
600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiff s occupation to the fence without
interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the
fence as a boundary.").
Argyle, 188 P.3d at 305 (footnote omitted). Assuming that the belief of some of the
plaintiffs constituted acquiescence, there was no evidence of any acquiescence by
the defendant, thus, no mutual acquiescence.
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The Court in Argyle also footnoted:
4. Because this case involves a review of the district court's legal
conclusions only, this court gives deference to the district court's factual
findings. Accordingly, this analysis assumes that Sterling Jones neither
informed Charles Argyle of the true ownership status of the disputed property
nor granted the Argyles permission to use the property.
Id., footnote 4. Accordingly, there was no need for the defendant to inform plaintiffs
of the conversation in 1965 relative to ownership of the two acres nor as to
continuing the use of the two acres by the plaintiffs.

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PRETRIAL
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ADJUDICATION THAT
SILENCE ALONE IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
ACQUIESCENCE IF THE DEFENDANT ALSO TREATED
THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY INSTEAD OF A BARRIER
AND LIMITING THE ISSUE FOR TRIAL AS BEING
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT TREATED THE FENCE AS A
BOUNDARY OR AS A BARRIER UNDER UTAH'S
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
This Court in Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252 (Utah App. 2006) ruled on
issues of silence, failure to object and knowledge of the existing line as a boundary:
[11] f 15 Various landowner activities may provide evidence of
acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary, such as "[occupation up to, but
never over, the line," or "silence, or the failure of a party to object to a line as
a boundary." Id. at \ 25. Although acquiescence in a boundary line may
occur through a party's silence or failure to object and does not require an
explicit agreement, "recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both
parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary
line." Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App 346,f 11, 118 P.3d 301 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quotations and
citations omitted).
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[12-14] T| 16 In the instant matter, although the Browns subjectively
believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually
communicated their belief to Jorgensen, either by word or action. Therefore,
there was no "actual acknowledgement... that the parties treat the [F]ence as
the common boundary." Moreover, "'[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to
be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time
will not establish it as the true boundary.5" Argyle, 2005 UT App 346 at f 13,
118 P.3cl 301 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah
267, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559
(Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiff s occupation to the fence without interference was
not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a
boundary.").
Id. at 1257.
There was no evidence that the defendants recognized or treated the fence as
a boundary. There was evidence that the defendant had knowledge that the fence
was not the boundary. The evidence was that the defendant maintained the fence to
retain cattle and horses and that the plaintiffs and predecessors maintained the fence
for the same reason.
In the Brown case, this Court also considered the purpose of the fence:
U 17 Additionally, "[f]rom the initial recognition of boundary by
acquiescence in Utah, courts have recognized the importance of the purpose
of a fence.' Id. at ^f 10. In this matter, the trial court found that Jorgensen's
predecessors "ran livestock on the land" and that the Browns and their
predecessors also "Used [their] property to graze cattle and sheep," among
other uses.
Brown, 136 P.3d at 1257-58. The fence having been erected before conveyances
separated the four acre tract (and the two acre tracts within) and was never erected
as a boundary between the plaintiffs' property and the defendants' property. Nor
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was it a boundary between their respective predecessors, but was erected at a time
when the properties had a common ownership. The continued use and purpose of
the fence was to contain livestock.
This Court in Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC

v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229

(Utah App. 1999), after stating that courts have recognized the importance of the
purpose of a fence, also held that mere acquiescence in use without more is
insufficient to establish boundary by acquiescence. See id. at 232, footnote 3.
In the instant case, Smith's have only proved an acquiescence in use.

POINT VII. ASSUMING THAT A DETERMINING FACTOR IN
ACQUIESCENCE IS THE TREATMENT OF THE FENCE AS
A BOUNDARY AND NOT AS A BARRIER, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE FENCE
WAS TREATED AS A BOUNDARY.
The use of the fence did not change prior to 1949 until the time of trial in
2008, during which time it was maintained to contain cattle. The fence was not
needed for any of the other farming operations such as raising hay.
Scott Smith, son of the plaintiff, William R. Smith, testified that he was born
on the farm in 1964 and worked on the farm until age 19, then returned to the farm
m 19S5 to take over tumvmg the farm performing such duties as cuttmg hay, balmg
hay, moving cows and fence. (Tr 24). Scott said that a drain ditch about two feet
from the fence, having dimensions of about eight feet across the top and four or five
feet at the bottom was put in initially to contain run off waters so you can farm and
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it also provides drinking water for the cattle. (Tr 28). Scott's recollection of
farming dates from the time he was five or six years old, and the fence and drain
have been in the same place since that time (1970).
Regarding repairs to the fence, Scott testified: (Tr 29)
Q

Describe for us what kind of repairs you had to make.

A
Well, we try to maintain fences so walk them, you staple wires where
you need. When wire becomes too old, you replace it. We've never replaced
any of the wire on that side of the fence but we have stapled it and we have,
you know, walked it and, you know, maintained to keep our cattle on our side
of the fence.
In 1978, the year which the plaintiffs contend began the acquiescence in the
fence as a boundary, Scott was 14 years old. We quote from his testimony in the
transcript from pages 40 to 44.
Q

And in 1978, how old would you be?

A

Fourteen, is that right. Fourteen? Yeah, 14.

Q
At that time part of the Smith Farm extended also into Section 23, 40
acres here, didn't it?
A

Yes.

Q

And that went to Verl?

A

Yes.

Q

But before it went to Verl, it was part of the Smith Farm, wasn't it?

A

Yes.

Q

So that this fence that goes from the section corner on north, was
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actually fenced between Smith's Farm 40 acres and the balance of the Smith
Farm; is that right?
A

Now state that again.

Q
The fence that comes from the section comer and comes south over to
the Staley property, that property that was east was all part of Smith's
property, wasn't it?
A

Yes.

Q
And there was a fence that divided the east part of Smith's property
and the west part, didn't it?
A

Yes.

Q

Why was this fence maintained?

A
To keep the livestock in that we would put on the east side there that
we pastured and so forth and back here to the back it was to keep the, so we
could green shop the - when we farmed that 40 acres, so we could green
shop that and the cows would have to stay behind the milk bam and so forth
where we would let them out during the day to get them off of the concrete.
Q

So that's why you used that fence?

A

Yes.

Q
And then there's a short distance of 379 feet that that fence continues
past the Smith -excuse me, the Security property, isn't that true?
A

Yes.

Q
Security's property goes clear over to the beginning of this A-2 drain,
doesn't it?
A

Yes.

Q
So that the only part[] of the Staley's property that is fenced that you
were utilizing were the 379 feet?
31

A

Yes.

Q

Do you know who built that fence along the Staley property?

A

I do not.

Q

Does it look like the same fence all the way?

A

No.

Q-

Where did it change?

A
Ummm, it changes - well, the fence as been changed, you know - this
fence no longer exists and I put this fence back in new a couple of years ago.
Q

No, you said this fence starting from the corner -

A

The corner is out here.

Q

- over about 290 feet no longer exists, you say?

A

Right.

Q

But from (inaudible) feet on, that same fence exists?

A

I replaced that fence.

Q

When did you replace it?

A

19 - shoot - 1991 maybe, give or take a couple of years in there.

Q

All right. Show me what portion of the fence you replaced.

A

I replaced from here to here.

Q

You're pointing from 290 feet from the corner over to -

A

I have fence that goes east and west at that point.

Q

So you replaced that in 1991 ?
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A

Roughly.

Q

In the same place?

A

Yes.

Q

And why did you replace it?

A
Why did I replace it? Because I was feeding cattle here in the winter
and I needed a solid fence to keep them where they belonged.
Q
Did you at any time replace the fence across the 379 feet of the Staley
property?
A

No, I have not.

Q

Who maintained that fence?

A
I've maintained it. The George's have maintained it. Last year a guy
by the name of Jeremiah Kingston put new wire on that fence.
Q

Why did he do that?

A
Why? Because he put cattle in there and they kept getting over in my
hay field.
It appears from the testimony of Scott Smith, the person who was on the
premises from 1985 to the time of trial, that the purpose of the fence was to contain
cattle. It would not be needed for haying or other farm purposes. The fence other
than along the 379 feet boundary of Security Investment (Stahle) was repaired and
maintained by Scott to contain cattle, and the 379 feet along the Stahle property was
repaired by "Georges" the tenant of Security Investment to contain livestock.
There was no evidence that the fence was ever built to mark a boundary, nor
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thereafter maintained to mark the boundary of property described in conveyances
occurring after 1983. All of the evidence was that the fence was used as a barrier to
contain cattle. There was no evidence that the Fence was evidence of ownership
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding boundary by acquiescence based upon belief
of some of the plaintiffs that the fence was the boundary as claimed by an affidavit
of Cindy S. Hatch. The only plaintiff to testify, Mack Smith, acknowledged that he
learned of the two acre parcel of Stahle (Security) in 1993, before the expiration of
the 20 year term in 1998, thus having actual knowledge of the legal boundaries. The
uncontroverted evidence was that the fence was used only as a barrier to contain
cattle. There was no evidence that the defendant ever recognized the fence as a
boundary and in fact the plaintiffs' own witness, Marv George testified that from
1965 to date of trial he and his family leased 65 acres from the defendant, and did
not fence the west two acres because they didn't need the extra pasture and it was
not worth fencing.
The cause should be remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment
dismissing the complaint and restoring of record the boundary description existing
prior to the judgment of September 4, 2008.
Dated this a_

day of December, 2008,

Respectfully submitted,

'George K. Fadel
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

Certificate of Service
I certified I mailed two copies of Appellant's brief and a disc to Mr. Wade R.
Budge, attorney for the plaintiffs-appellees, 15 West south Temple, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101-1004, thisj?
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2.

JUDGMENT.

3.

Portion of JT Exhibit 3 of the Davis County

Recorder's Plat of all of section 22,T 2 N R 1 W.
4. STIPULATION CONCERNING TRIAL EXHIBITS ( 4 pages).
5. JT Exhibit 11, Warranty Deed, from William Howard
Smith et ux. (parents of plaintiffs) to ALKALI LIMITED, 1978,
describing plaintiffs1 tract as set forth in complaint.
6. JT Exhibit 12, Quit Claim deed by ALKALI LIMITED
to the four plaintiffs as partners of ALKALI LIMITED to BMJC,
L.L.C. wherein plaintiffs are members, 1999.
7. JT Exhibit 13, Quit Claim Deed by SECURITY INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a corporation, to SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD,defendant.
The second description of 14.90 acres includes defendant's two
acre tract in Section 22, and 12.90 acres in Section 23.(1997)
8.JT Exhibit, photo copies picturing area of the
subject fenceline. JT

Exhibit 14 color copies reproduced by App.

9. JT Exhibit 16, DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AGREEMENT,
by heirs of plaintiffs' grandparents dividing the extended farm
property among four children, one of whom, William Howard Smith,
is the father of plaintiffs who receives the tract described in
the complaint.
10. JT Exhibit 17, USA PATENT TO HEBER C. WOOD, dated
2-12-1883, which describes the South Half of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 22, 80 acres which includes Plaintiffs1
entire tract as well as defendant's two acre tract.
11. JT Exhibit 18, a deed by HEBER C. WOOD to
JACOB GIERISCH describing the same 8 0 acre tract of JT Exhibit
17, dated 2-13-1883, excepting however " FOUR ACRES LYING AND
SITUATE IN THE NORTH EAST CORNER OF THE SAID SOUTH HALF OF THE
SOUTH EAST QUARTER OF SECTION NO. 22, T 2 N R 1 vV, of which
the north two acres becomes that of the defendant, and the

1

south two acres became the property of the plaintiffs as a
part of the property described in the complaint.
12.

JT Exhibit 19, a deed by HEBER C. WOOD on

December 14, 1901, to JACOB GIERIbCH of tne four acre tract
described in JT Exhibit 18.
13. JT Exhibit 20, a Warranty Deed, May 1, 1913,
by JACOB GIERISCH to ANCEL HATCH which excludes the four acres
tram the 80 acres tract described in Exhibit 18.
14. JT Exhibit 21, a Warranty Deed by ALVIN
ELIZABETH HATCH to ANCEL HATCH in 1940,

and

at the bottom of tne

page describes the south two acres belonging to nhe plaintiffs.
15. JT Exhibit 22, a SALE AGREEMENT dated Feb.12,1948,
by ANCEL HATCH et ux. , as Sellers to WILLIAM GUFFEY, et ux.,
describing several parcels, one of which , the second from the
DOttom,of the page, describes the plaintiffs' two acres. The
plaintiffs1 grandfather , WILLIAM R. SMITH , received an assignment of the said SALE AGRniEM^NT.

2

is

H HMRBHIB^

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT,

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from Bench

WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A.
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK G.
SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH as Trustees
of THE MACK G. AND CAROLYN SMITH
REVOCABLE TRUST; J. LYNN SMITH, as
Trustee of THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING
TRUST; and CINDY S. HATCH, an
individual,
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060700147 SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM
BENCH TRIAL CONDUCTED ON JUNE
5, 2008

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 060700147

vs.
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10,

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 20, 2006. In that complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that they and the defendants were neighbors, and that their properties had been separated
by a barbed wire fence for at least fifty years. The plaintiffs' property is west of the defendants'
property, and so the fence is on the east side of the plaintiffs' property.
The plaintiffs discovered that the fence was not the actual property boundary. A portion
of the defendants' property ("the Parcel"), which was approximately two acres in size, was on the
west side of the fence (on the plaintiffs' side). Because the plaintiffs had used the property for a

lengthy period of time, they sought to resolve the dispute by asking the defendants to sign a
2

boundary agreement which would show that the Parcel belonged to the plaintiffs. The defendants

*

refused to sign the boundary agreement, and the parties commenced this litigation.

9

The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2007. The litigation

a
tH

of that motion lasted for almost six months. On March 21, 2008, the Court issued a ruling in

3
$

which it denied the motion for summary judgment. The Court held that the second element of the
test for boundary by acquiescence had not been clearly satisfied, and so summary judgment
would be improper. The Court did hold that the other three elements were satisfied, and so the
only remaining issue for trial was whether the second requirement was satisfied.
The Court conducted a bench trial on this matter on June 5, 2008. The Court now issues
its findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence presented at that trial.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiffs and the defendants are neighbors. The plaintiffs' property is located
west of the defendants' property.

2.

There has been a barbed wire fence on the east side of the plaintiffs' land since at
least 1964. In fact, it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence is in
the same location that it has been since 1949.

3.

That fence is the boundary between the plaintiffs' property and a number of other
properties owned by different individuals. The fence follows a straight, or nearly
straight, course. The fence follows the record boundaries, with one exception. In
one portion of the fence line, the fence line does not follow the record boundary.
Instead, the fence continues in a straight line and cuts off a two-acre parcel that is
recorded as belonging to the defendants. That parcel ("the Parcel") is the basis of
Page 2 of 8

the dispute between the parties.
Both parties helped maintain the fence.
The plaintiffs' property was passed down through inheritance to the current
owners. The plaintiffs took possession of the property in 1978. All of the plaintiffs
and their predecessors used the Parcel for farming and grazing. The plaintiffs were
never told not to use the Parcel, and the plaintiffs were never informed that the
Parcel belonged to the defendants. The defendants have not used the Parcel for
any purpose, and individuals who leased the defendants' property likewise did not
use the Parcel for any purpose.
The plaintiffs have always believed that the fence is the boundary between their
property and the defendants' property.
Both parties have grazed cattle on their respective properties.
There are two ditches that follow different portions of the fence. All ditches are
located on the west side of the fence, and are thus on the plaintiffs' side of the
fence.
The ditch that follows the portion of the fence that borders the Parcel is the Smith
drain. There were some allegations during the litigation of the motion for
summary judgment that the fence might have served as a barrier to livestock, and
that the fence kept the cattle out of the drain ditch. However, the fence is only on
one side of the ditch. As noted above, both parties ran cattle on their respective
properties. Thus, the fence did keep the defendants' cattle out of the Smith drain,
but there was no fence to keep the plaintiffs' cattle out of the Smith drain. In fact,
Scott Smith testified that the plaintiffs use the Smith drain to help water their
cattle. Thus, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was

required to keep cattle from entering the ditch.
,H

10.

Mack Smith is the grandson of William R. Smith, who purchased the property that

K

now belongs to the plaintiffs. Mack Smith testified that the Smith drain was dug

-

after the fence was constructed, and the digging of the drain had no effect on the

w

3

location of the fence.
11.

«

Marvin George testified that in approximately 1965> he, his father, and another
gentleman were working on the fence, and had a discussion with one of the
plaintiffs' predecessors. Marvin George testified that the substance of the
conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants'
property, were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the
Parcel). There was no testimony given that showed that any of the plaintiffs knew
of this conversation, and there was no testimony given that the plaintiffs knew
after 1978 that the Parcel was actually the defendants' property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

There are four requirements that must be met before this Court can establish a
boundary by acquiescence. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1998).
There must be "(0 occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences,
or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long
period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Id. (internal citation omitted).

2.

The Court previously denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
because it was not clear whether the fence in question had been built to serve as a
barrier or whether it was intended as a boundary. Thus, the second requirement for
boundary by acquiescence had not been satisfied. However, the Court did find that
the first and fourth requirements had been satisfied. The Court also found that the

third element was satisfied, but only if the second element was also satisfied.
Thus, the only remaining issue to be determined at trial was whether the purpose
of the fence was to be a barrier instead of a boundary.
The plaintiffs' property was transferred to them in 1978, and this is the year that
began the twenty-year period that is required in order to establish a claim for
boundary by acquiescence. There has been no evidence presented to show that the
plaintiffs knew that the fence was not the record boundary. In fact, all of the
plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they believed that the fence was the actual
boundary between their property and the defendants' property.
The conversation described by Marvin George occurred in 1965, and none of the
plaintiffs witnessed that conversation. Therefore, the conversation is outside of the
relevant time frame, and because none of the plaintiffs knew of the content of the
conversation, the plaintiffs are not estopped from claiming that they believed that
the fence was the proper boundary between their property and the defendants'
property.
The issue in this case is whether the fence served as a boundary, or whether it was
intended solely as a barrier. Of course, fences that serve as boundaries are also
often de facto barriers. All fences are barriers of some type. However, the key
consideration is whether the purpose of the fence was to keep cattle from moving
from one location to another, or whether the primary purpose of the fence was to
act as the boundary (and as a secondary purpose also keep cattle in the correct
property). In the case of Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, there was also
a fence between two properties. 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In that
case, the Court of Appeals held that the fence was a barrier, rather than a

boundary. Id. The Court of Appeals noted in that case that it was impractical to
put a fence along the true boundary, because the defendants' property contained

w

w
w

|

cliffs and gullies. Id. There was no such impracticality in this case. It would have

-

been very easy for the defendants' or plaintiffs' predecessors to build a fence on

3

the record boundary, but that was not done.

|

5.

4

The Court finds that the primary purpose of this fence was to serve as a boundary.
That finding is supported by several facts described above. First, the fence was
built before the Smith drain was constructed. Thus, the purpose of the fence was
to mark the boundary (with a secondary purpose to serve as a barrier to keep cattle
on the appropriate property), rather than to keep cattle out of the Smith drain.
Second, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was necessary to
keep cattle out. In fact, the plaintiffs used the ditch to help water their cattle.
Third, the fence followed a straight line, and was the proper boundary between the
plaintiffs' property and properties of various other individuals. The Court finds
that the parties' predecessors simply continued following that straight line when
constructing the fence, likely believing that the property boundaries followed that
same straight line.

6.

Because the Court finds that the fence served as a boundary, and not merely as a
barrier, all of the elements of the test for boundary by acquiescence have been
satisfied.
CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they sought in their complaint.
The Court grants the plaintiffs' request for a judgment that the legal boundary between the
plaintiffs' land and the defendants' land is the barbed wire fence. The Court also orders that the

defendants have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in the property described in this ruling as
the Parcel.
The Court directs counsel for the plaintiffs to prepare the judgment for the Court's
signature.

Date signed:_

$'4't>?.
DISTRICT COItfRT JUDG
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George K. Fadel
Fadel Associates
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Wade R. Budge
Troy L. Booher
Snell and Wilmer, LLP
15 West South Temple
Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Cnik^

Wade R. Budge (8482)
Troy Booher (9419)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A.
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK
G. SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH, as
Trustees of THE MACK G. AND
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE
TRUST; J. LYNN SMITH as Trustee of
THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING TRUST;
and CINDY S. HATCH, an individual,

FINAL ORDER, JUDGMENT AND
DECREE QUIETING TITLE TO
PLAINTIFFS
Civil No. 060700147
Honorable Michael G. Allphin

Plaintiffs,
i

vs.
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10,

VD24507153
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060700147 SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD

Defendants.

Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from Bench Trial
Conducted on June 5,2008,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

o n n 11 A i

PI.

%

1.

Plaintiffs' are the owners of the parcel of land described below (the "Property")

f

,;

and assigned parcel number 06-030-0010 by the Davis County Recorder:

o
$
£

A parcel of land located in Davis County, Utah, more particularly
described as:
Beginning at the East Quarter Corner Section 22, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base And Meridian, and running thence South
00°05'015" West 1318.01 feet; thence East 2.08 feet to a point on an
existing wire fence; thence along said wire fence the following four (4)
calls: South 00°14'57" East 66.25 feet; South 01°08'27" West 147.06
feet; South 01°13'17" East 164.46 feet; South 02°49'13" West 1.90 feet;
thence West 3.44 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 617.00 feet; thence
South 89°53'20" West 150.01 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 290.40
feet; thence South 89°53'20" West 1743.53 feet; thence North 00°02'17"
East 2606.98 feet; thence North 89°56'55" East 1895.79 feet to the point
of beginning;
Subject to the interest of the Utah Department of Transportation obtained
from Plaintiffs in Case No. 010700258, Second Judicial District Court.
2.

Defendant Security Investment Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, owns a parcel of

land that adjoins the Property and is located to the east of the Property and has been assigned
parcel number 06-030-0012 by the Davis County Recorder.

The easterly boundary of the

Property and the westerly boundary of the parcel of land owned by Security Investment Ltd., is
on a the boundary line described as follows:
Beginning at the East Quarter Corner Section 22, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base And Meridian, and running thence South
00°05'015" West 1318.01 feet; thence East 2.08 feet to a point on an
existing wire fence; thence along said wire fence the following four (4)
calls: South 00°14'57" East 66.25 feet; South 01°08'27" West 147.06
feet; South 01°13'17" East 164.46 feet; South 02°49'13" West 1.90 feet;
thence West 3.44 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 617.00 feet along the
Westerly line of said section.

9022114?

1

3.

Plaintiffs' title to the Property is quieted against Defendant Security Investment

Ltd., and all those claiming by or through Defendant Security Investment Ltd., and its
predecessors, including all persons claiming any rights, title, estate, or interest in the Property
adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership, or clouding its title thereto.
4.

Each of the parties to this action must bear their own court costs and attorney fees

incurred in this action.

r

ENTERED this ^j_

day of

S^A

2008.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Michadtt G. Allp^
Second Judicial District Co
Approved as to form:

GGeorge& Fadel, Esq.^ .

CL

Attorney for Defendant
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Wade R. Budge (8482)
Troy L. Booher (9419)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A.
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK
G. SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH, as
Trustees of THE MACK G. AND
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE
TRUST, as Trustee of THE J. LYNN
SMITH LIVING TRUST; and CINDY S.
HATCH, an individual,

STIPULATION CONCERNING
TRIAL EXHIBITS

Case No. 060700147
Plaintiff,
Honorable Michael G. Allphin
vs.

SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs THE SMITH FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; THE MACK G. AND
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE TRUST; THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING TRUST; and

8809786 1

Cindy S. Hatch (collectively the "Plaintiffs"), and defendant SECURITY INVESTMENT
LTD, by and through their attorneys, hereby stipulate to eh admissibility and authenticity of
the trial exhibits identified below (the "Exhibits"):
Joint Number
JTl.
JT2.
JT3.
JT4.

Exhibit Description
Larsen & Malmquist Inc. Survey

1

Date
1/24/2006

1 Davis County Plat map covering Section 23, Township
2 North, Range 1 West
1 Davis County Plat map covering Section 22, Township
2 North,, Range 1 West
5/26/1958
USDA Aerial Survey

JT5.

USDA Aerial Survey

5/03/1965

JT6.

USDA Aerial Survey

10/19/1971 1

JT7.

USDA Aerial Survey

6/20/1980

JT8.

USDA Aerial Survey

9/09/1987

JT9.

USDA Aerial Survey

10/04/1997

JT10.

USDA Aerial Survey

8/26/2003

JT11.
JTl 2.

JT13.
L

8809786 1

Warranty Deed by William Howard Smith and Lois G. 1 10/9/1978
Smith to Alkali Limited which was recorded 10/20/78
Quit Claim Deed by William R. Smith, Mack G. Smith, 4/27/1999
John Lynn Smith and Cindy Smith, being all partners of
Alkali Limited to BMJC, LLC, recorded 5/4/99
Quitclaim Deed, Security Investment Company, a Utah 1 11/30/97
corporation to Security Investment Ltd., a Utah limited
|
1 partnership recorded 12/1/97.

2

1

1 JT14.
JT15.
JT16.

JT17.
JT18.

JT19.
JT20.
JT21.
JT22.
JT23.
JT24.
JT25.
JT26.

JT27.

1 Photographs of the subject fence and property
surrounding the subject fence
Two Davis County photo maps of the subject area in
J 1982.
J A "Deed of Conveyance and Agreement" recorded 3-873 among William Howard Smith, et ux., Verl Reed
Smith, et ux., Joyce Smith Goodfellow and Jean Smith
Sanders, recorded in Book 511, at page 74, in the office
of the Davis County Recorder
1 Patent from United States to Heber C Wood recorded
on Book G, Page 859, Davis County Recorder.
Indenture of Heber C Wood to Jacob Gierisch, dated
December 13, 1877, recorded in Book G, Page 860,
Davis County Recorder
Indenture of HEBER C. WOOD to Jacob Gierisch,
1901, recorded in Book R Page 508.
Deed from Jacob Gierisch to Ancel Hatch dated
Book 1-R Page 331, where Alvin Hatch conveys to
Ancel Hatch.
Book O Page 428, Sale Agreement by Ancel and Amy
Hatch to William Guffey et ux..
Assignment of the Sale Agreement by Guffey to
William R. Smith and Ella Howard Smith, joint tenants,
recorded in Book 1, Page 343.
Decree in the estate of Ancel Hatch settling the contract 1
sale to Smihts, Book 96 at Page 28 ff.
Administrators Deed to Smith, Book 96, Page 32.
1
A Decree in judgment referencing a deed from Mamie
E. Winegar to John & Lena V. Winegar, recorded in
Book 1 -L of Deeds Page 277.
Warranty Deed by Lena V. Winegar, widow, to
1
Security Investment Company, dated April 10, 1951,
recorded April 27,1951, in Book 25 of Records at page

1204.

8809786 1

1

3

1 JT28.

Warranty Deed, by William Howard Smith and Lois G.
Smith to William Howard Smith dated 5-2-73, recorded
5-3-73 in Book 515 Page 260.

The parties stipulate that if any of the foregoing exhibits is referred to or offered, it
shall be admitted into evidence, provided, however, that the parties reserve the right to object
at trial to any of the foregoing exhibits on the basis of Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Nothing in this stipulation shall prevent any party from seeking to use other
exhibits at trial.
DATED this ^

day of June, 2008.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

Wafoe R. Budge
Troy L. Booher
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DATED this /

h

day of June, 2008.
FADEL ASSOCIATES

\£**jU&-&&t<X

K. Fadel
Attorneys for Defendant
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WARRANTY DEED

William Howard Smith and Lois G. Smith
of
Bountiful
, County of
Davis
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to A l k a l i Limited

grantor s
, State of Utah, hereby

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

of Bountiful, Davis County, Utah,
Ten and no/100 ($10.00)
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

County,

Davis

See a t t a c h e d E x h i b i t "A"

1

1
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WITNESS, the hand s of said grantor s , this
9**
<g?CAf£^
.A.D.19 7 8 .

day of

&£-»

Signed in the Presence of

~77
STATE OF UTAH,
County of
On the

day of
&£^£sAs

A D . 19 7 8 ,

personally appeared before me
the signer s of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
same.
samp..

executed the
•* l " ' '

Notary
Nqjar Public. '
My commission expires!

~r~
_
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EXHIBIT

!,

A

Beginning at a point North 0°05 ! 15 M East 323.40 feet along
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22,
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and
running thence North 0 05'15 H East 617.0 feet along the
East line of said Section; thence West 231.0 feet; thence
North 0°05 ! 15 M East 379.60 feet parallel to the East Section
line; thence East 231.0 feet; thence North 0°05 T 15 n East
1318.01 feet, more or less, to the East Quarter corner of
said Section 22; thence South 89°56'55M West 1895.78 feet
along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said section to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56'55 n East from the
center of said section; thence South 0°02 ! 17 M West 2606.98
feet parallel to the West line of said Southeast Quarter
to a point 33.0 feet North of the South line of said Section; thence North 89°53 t 20 n East 1743.53 feet, parallel
to and 33.0 feet North of the South line of said section
to a point 150.0 feet West of the East line of said section;
thence North 0°05 ! 15 n East 290.4 feet; thence North
89°53 ! 20 n East 150.0 feet to the point of beginning,
containing less the following exception, 104.87 acres.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the interest of the grantors, Jean Smith
Sanders and Joyce Smith Goodfellow in the following portion
thereof: Beginning at a point 33.0 feet North 0°05 , 15 n East
along the Section line and South 89°53,20fl West 1270.0 feet
parallel to the South Section line from the Southeast corner
of said Section 22, and running thence North 2607.0 feet,
more or less, to the North line of the Southeast Quarter
of said Section; thence South 89°56'55 n West 90.0 feet along
said North line; thence South 2607.0 feet to a point 33.0
feet North of the South line of said section; thence North
89°53 ! 20 n East 90.0 feet to the point of beginning.

RETURNED
MAY - 4 1999
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
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Cindy S. Hatch
958 East Oakwood Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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QUIT CLAIM DEED

x

OO-OO

THIS

B2 * 9 3 P

QUIT

Q^JM

DEED/

made

by ALKALI

LIMITED,

- by

WILLIAM R. SMITH, MACK G. SMITH, JOHN LYNN SMITH and CINDY SMITH
HATCH, being all of the partners of Alkali Limited, Grantor, to
the Grantee hereinafter named.
•WHEREAS,

on

or

about

September

25,

14raited,a Utah limited partnership, vas established

1978,

Alkali

by filing

a

written certificate of limited partnership with the State of Utah;
and
WHEREAS, Alkali Limited has failed to file documents
required by the State of Utah to maintain the status of limited
partnership; and
WHEREAS, Alkali limited is new a general partnership.
THEREFORE, for valuable consideration received, Grantor
hereby QUIT CLAIMS to BMJC, L L C ,
Bountiful, Utah
($10.00)

and

of 958 East Oakwood Drive,

84010, Grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars

other

good

and valuable

consideration,

all

of

Grantor's right, title, and interest in the following described
rqal

property

20S

5HERYL L- WHITE/ DAVIS CNTY RECORDER
1999 HAY 4 ?:Q0 AH FEE 1 6 . 0 0 DEP ITT
REC'D FOR HATCH' CIHDY

located

in

Davis

County,

State

2

o f Utah;

£ 1510256

B2493 P

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT

WITNESS the hands of the general partners of Grantor

this t 7 day of

y^^-^C

, 1999.

•n—y

ALKALI LIMITED

<£?

*>y UlKilli*rJk. IAJIL

OHN LYNN SMITH, p a r t n e r
CINDY SM
STATE OF fSst&b

TCH, p a r t n e r

)
(ss.

COUNTY OF,t.-XX'VlAP'

On

/

V)

the

Z7

day

of

^JU^*'^

1999,

/

personally appeared before me WILLIAM R. SMITH, signer of the
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed
the same in his capacity as general partner of Alkali Limited,
NOTARY P/OBLIC
My Commission Expires:

/

Residing at: ^t&4*<&&'

T

Notary Public
GregLSwensOn
5770 S.25QE. #115
Murray, Utah 84107

My Commfeslon Expkaa
September 1,2002

State of Utah

I j ^ ^

209

.FtlQ25<S

B2493F

STATE OF //6(pL*
(ss.

COUNTY OY^iMUlhX.)
On

personally

the

^7

da

y

1599,

of

appeared before me MACK G. SMITH, signer

of the

foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed
the same in his capacity as general partner of Alkali Limited.
/fj

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

My Commission Expires:

•jUlC

A

T

GregL Swenson
5770 S. 250 E. #115
Murray, Utah 84107

STATE OF Mskh

)

QV^frUfht'hl

COUNTY

On

)
~Z7

the

day

of

1999,

^ ^ ^ A / C

personally appeared before me JOHN LYNN SMITH, signer of the
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed
the same in his capacity as general partner of JU.kg.li Limited.
NOTARY P B B L I C

Residing' a t :

^MAAsisi^^

MyhtA*

My Commission Expires:

STATE OF
COUNTY

tfjhcA^.

)
)

OES&GTAW^L

On

Notary Public
GraaUSwQnson
S770B.MlE.#1t5
Murray-Utah 84107
MyCommtestonfajfces
Septentoerlf20O2
SiatoofUtolL

the

1999,

2 7

personally appeared before me CINDY SMITH HATCH, signer of the
foregoing

Quit

Claim Deed, who acknowledged

to me that she

executed the same in her capacity as general partner of Alkali
Limited

Notary Public
Greg L. Swanson
5770 S 250 E. #115
Murray Utah B4107
My Commission Expim*
September 1,8002
State of Utah

My Commission E x p i r e s :

/0^L£^/
v^^Q^g<^<—*
NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g ' a t : 7VUt<*vu/'

L

SM1TH4/E99/W
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Beginning at a point North 0°05,15fl East 323.40 feet along
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22 y
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and
running thence North 0 OS'lS" East 617.0 feet along the
East line of said Section; thence West 231.0 feet; thence
North 0°05T15" East 379.60 feet parallel to the East Section
line; thence East 231*0 feet; thence North 0 05f15u East
1318.01 feet, more or less, to the East Quarter corner of
said Section 22; thence South 89°56f55M West 1895.78 feet
along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said section to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56'55n East from the
center of said section; thence South 0°02l17" West 2606-98
feet parallel to the West line of said Southeast Quarter
to a point 33.0 feet North"of the South line of said Section; thence North 89°53r20n East 1743.53 feet, parallel
to and 33.0 feet North of the South line of said section
to a point 150,0 feet West of the East line of said section;
thence UNorth 0°05'15n East 290,4 feet; thence North
3?°53'2Q
East 150,0 feet to the point of beginning,
containing less the following exception, 104.87 acres.
Jean Smith Sanders and Joyce Smith Goodfellov in the
following portion thereof: Beginning at a point 33.0
feet North 0°05,,15,f East along "the Section line ..and J
South 89°53\20u West 1270.0 feet,..parallel to'the South
Section line from the Southeast corner of said Section
22, and running thence North 2607.0 feet, more or less,
to the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said Section:
thence„„South 89°56J55" West 90 .Q .feet^along said North li^ie;
thence South 2607.0 feet to a point 33.0~feet North of the
South line of said section? thence North 89°53r20" East
90.0 feet to the point of beginning.
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QUIT-CLAIM

DEED

SECURITY INVESTMNTCOMPANT^
B o u n t i f i l l y County^bfbayls,V •Sjj&te' ; '6fSutah/ : ;hereby dWVEYS ^arid
of Bountif u^^^
Dollars a n ^

.the?;siim;<6J: !fien

tract of land in Davis County/ State^ of Utah, tbrwit:
Beginning 92*75 rods north 25.99 rods east from swsdorner
Of SEC 23/ T2N-RlWr S ^
89*25' east :13l.84 rods/S southi5'2^j*<Ba^:l'-.82:::rpds/
south 8 ; 12 rods/nor th 8J9 * 26. >; i ^ t 1 ^2/^8 r bds to
beginning^ containing^8.23^ acres.
Also beginning 960.48 feet north from sw corner of SEC
i3>^T2N-RlWj SkiM; east 412/5 t ^ t ^ north 423*22 feet/
east 2191.27 feet, nbrthl64.34 f ^
south 100 feefc/ttesfc 4 1 2 ^
231 feet/ south 379.6 ieet/east 23!^feet, n ^
feet: to beginning, containing 14.90 acres.
In all 23.13 acres.
WITNESS the hands of said Grantor, this 30th day of November,
1997*
SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation
Nora A. Stable,
President

«»!«»

STATE OF UTAH,

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

^

£

^

^

±

,

2 2 o 9

On the 30th day of November, 1997, personally appeared before
me NORA A. STAHLE who, being by me duly sworn, did say that she is
President of Security Investment Company, a Utah Corporation, and
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of
said Corporation by authority of a Resolution of its Board of
Directors, and said NORA A. STAHLE duly acknowledged to me that
said Corporation executed the saifle.
My Commission Expires t

..' Notary Public ..y
Moivutf rtmic

Residing afpuu+aJL^

WSouftMdft
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DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AGREEMENT

377265

* • • ™ d %1-O.^JLDOU^Nc Recorder D^. County
P « * < - ^ - -

jflll-^'*

-fuJ

^ ' A V ^ '"
WILLIAM HOWARD SMITH and LOIS G. SMITH, his wife; VERL

REED SMITH and EVELYN SMITH, his wife; JOYCE SMITH GOODFELLOW, of
Bountiful, Utah, and JEAN SMITH SANDERS of Kaysville, Utah, GRANTORS,
of Davis County, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT as against
the acts of the GRANTORS and those claiming by, through or under the
GRANTORS, the following described tracts of land in Davis County,
State of Utah, unto the GRANTEES of the separate tracts herein
described as being conveyed to the stated, separate grantees, as
follows:
UNTO WILLIAM HOWARD SMITH and LOIS G. SMITH, his wife,
as joint tenants of Bountiful, Utah, the following described tract:

v
Ai

LJ

£
*«
~o c>
«5 *
*£
^
D
~g
a
§•
.9
^

Beginning at a point North 0°05*15" East 323-40 feet along
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22,
Township 2 North, Range 1f West,
Salt Lake Meridian, and
running thence North 0°05 15ff East 617-0 feet along ohe
East line of
said Section; thence West 231-0 feet; thence
North 0°05!15" East 379-60 feet parallel to the ,East
Section
line; thence East 231-0 feet; thence North 0°05 15n East
1318,01 feet, more or less, to the East
Quarter corner of
said Section 22; thence South &9° 56f 55" West 1895-78 feet,
along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said
section to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56*55"
E£st from
the center of said section; thence South 0°02,17" Wes«
2606,98 feet parallel to the West line of said Souuheast
Quarter to a point 33-0 feet North of
the South line
of said Section; thence North 89°53!20n East 1743-53
feet, parallel to and 33-0 feet North of the South line
of said section to a point 150.0 feet West of the East
line of said section; thence North 0°05r15" East 290-4
feet; thence North 89°53,20" East 150.0 feet to the
point of beginning, containing less the following exception, 104-87 acres. EXCEPTING THEREFROM the interest
of the grantors, Jean Smith Sanders and Joyce Smith
Goodfellow in the following portion
thereof: Beginning
at a point 33-0 feet fNorth 0°05?15" East along the Section
line and South 89°53 20" West 1270.0 feet parallel to the
South Section line from the Southeast corner of said
Section 22, and running thence North 2607-0 feet, more or
less, to the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said
Section; thence South 89°56,55" West 90.0 feet along
said North line; thence South 2607-0 feet to a point
33.0 feet North ofTthe South line of said section;
thence North 89°53 20" East 90.0 feet to the point of
beginning

UNTO VERL REED SMITH and EVELYN SMITH, his wife, as joint
tenants, of Bountiful, Utah, the following described tract:
^fft
<S> ^
i y
<jF

Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running
thence North 0°05T15" East 761.31 feet along the Section
line; thence South 89°34T East 1245-91 feet; thence South
1287.61 feet, more or less, to the North line of a Highway,

2
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75
50.0 feet perpendicularly distant Northerly from the
center line thereof; thence South 89° 31* West 762.60
feet, more or less, along said highway; thence Westerly
65.O feet along said highway along the arc of a 550
foot radius curve to the left; thence Westerly along
the North line of 500 South street to the West line of
Section 26, said Township and Range; thence North 0°19T54n
East along said Section line to the point of beginning,
containing 37-37 acres, more or less.
UNTO JEAN SMITH SANDERS of Kaysville, Utah, the following
described tracts:

0,\>
^

Beginning at a point 33.0 feet North 0°02r17" East along
the Quarter Section line from the Southwest corner of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 22, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence
North 0°02T17" East 2607-76 feet along the Quarter Section
line to the Northwest corner of said Southeast Quarter;
thence North 89056f55" East 375-34 feet along the
North
line of said Quarter Section; thence South 0°02r17" West
2607.37 feet to a point 33-0 feet North
of the South line
of said section; thence South 89°53r20" West 375-34 feet
parallel to the South line of said section to the point
of beginning, containing 22.47 acres, more or less.

Beginning at a point North 0°15r15ft East
761.31 feet
along the Section line and South 89°34f East 1517-38
feet from the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township
2 Ncrth, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Meridian, and running
thence South 89°34T East 261.90 feet to a point due
•Lj North of a point 52.25 rodF West along the Section line
^ty from the South Quarter corner of said Section 23; thence
w>' Ko South 748.50 feet to said Section line; thence South
P *r 89°58*45" East 2.15 feet along said Section line; thence
South 5° East 532.20 feet, more or less, along the West
VV
^
line of the property conveyed to Rulon G. Ashworth by
Warranty Deed recorded Jan. 25, I960, in Book 180, Page
446 of Official Records, to the North line of a highway,
50.0 feet perpendicularly distant Northerly from the
center line thereof; thence South 89°31f West 310.43
feet, more or less, along said highway to a point due
South of the point of beginning; thence North 1283.27
feet, more or less, to the point of beginning, containing
8.01 acres, more or less.
UNTO DON E. G00DFELL0W and JOYCE SMITH G00DFELL0W, his
wife, as joint tenants, of Bountiful, Utah, the following described
tracts:
Beginning at a point North 0°02f17Tf East
33-0 feet along
the Quarter Section line and North 89053*20" East 375-34
feet parallel to the South line of said Section from the
A
**).*" Southwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 22,
\\'
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and
D
running thence North 89°53r20" East 375-34 feet; thence
North 0°02!17" East 2606.98 feet to the North line of said
Quarter Section; thence South 89°56'55" West
375-34 feet
along said North line; thence South Wt^Y]"1
West 2607-37*
feet to the point of beginning, containing 22-47 acres,
more or less.
^\s
lr\A*
^y
>'*

o Beginning at a point North 0°05f?15" East 761.31 feet along
the Section line and South 89°34 East 1245-91 feet from
the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence South
89°34r East 271-47 feet; thence South 1283-27 feet, more
or less, to the North line of a Highway, 50.0 feet

- 3 -

76
perpendicularly distant Northerly from the center line
thereof; thence South 89°31! West 271.47 feet along said
highway; thence North 1287.61 feet, more or less, to
the point of beginning, containing 8.01 acres, more or
less.
Excepting and reserving unto the Grantors, other then
Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, an easement for ingress and
egress and eventual street purposes to the extent necessary to
provide a street 50 feet in width which may be accomplished by
use of the existing 33-0 foot right-of-way adjoining the South
boundary of the said Southeast Quarter of Section 22, owned by
Jordan Fur and Reclamation Co., or at the option of the Grantors
other than Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, the easement can be
relocated before dedication as a public street within an area up
to 300 feet Northerly from the South boundary of said Southeast
Quarter of said Section 22.
Excepting and reserving and granting to the Grantors and
Grantees easements for irrigation ditches and for pipelines as the
main ditches and pipelines are presently located for irrigation of
the tracts conveyed to the Grantees herein, with the right of the
servient owner to relocate the said ditches or pipelines or to
change the same in form so long as the irrigation water is delivered
to the dominant tenement in substantially the same place the easement enters the dominant tenement land unless the dominant tenement agrees otherwise.
Excepting and reserving unto the Grantors William Howard
Smith and Lois G. Smith, as joint tenants, an undivided 355°; unto
Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, as joint tenants, an undivided
35$; unto Don E. Goodfellow and Joyce Smith Goodfellow, as joint
tenants, an undivided 15$; and unto Jean Smith Sanders, an undivided
15$, in and to the underground water rights in the property above
described as being within Sections 23 and 26, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, including but not limited to the Certificate of
Appropriation of Water, No. 7009, recorded October 18, 196? in the
office of the Davis County Recorder in Book 329, Page 30L. and to
the rights represented by Change Application No. 31-1^57, A-3921
in the office of the State Engineer of the State of Utah. The
parties hereto agree that the- said underground water will be permitted
to flow westerly for continuous use by all parties hereto in the
proportions above stated and particularly for stock watering purposes.
It is agreed that the parties herein who are designated
joint tenants of a particular tract are also joint tenants of the
interest of the other joint tenant in the 90 feet by 2607.O feet
tract excepted from the first above-described tract. ,

"£>

WITNESS the hands of the parties this,.

_day of

February, 1973•
William Howard Smith
^ 6 i s <Jtf ,Smith
Verl Reed Smith
Evelytf Smith
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No. 73707

WARRANTY DEED,
John L. Hatch and Delia M. Hatch, Husband and wife, and Laura L. H. Eskelson,

| grantors woods Cross, County of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY AND WARRANT to
Kamas,
Wasatch,
Security Investment Company, A Utah Corporation, grantee of for the sum of Ten Dollars
and other good and valuable considerations the following tract of land in Davis County,
State of Utah,
i!

Commencing at a point 52.76 rods North and 25.48 rods East and North 2° 1Q<

j East 16.92 rods,

being

the point of commencement'of

boundary from the southwest corner

I of the southwest quarter of Section 23, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, United States Survey, and running thence North 2° 10* East 13.08 rods) thence
South 89° 28* East 132.76 rods; thence South 5° 30* East 13.03 rods* thence North 89°
31» West 133.33 rods to the place of commencement, containing 10.90 acres, more or less t
WITNESS the hands of said grantors, this 15th day of December A. D. 1939
Signed in the presence of

John L. Hatch
Delia M. Hatch
Laura L. H. Eskelson
"DOCUMENTARY!

State of Utah,

\

County of Davis

\

ss.

On the 15th day of December A. D. 1939 personally appeared before me John L.
S Hatch and Delia M. Hatch, Husband and Wife, the signers of the within instrument, who
j duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
My Commission expires
March 22, 1941.

^^^^

Henry W Stahle

ff /SBA!\

Notary Public residing

\ ^ ^ ^

at Bountiful, Utah.

I STATE OF UTAH,

1
s SS.
COUNTY OF WASATCH. t
On the 29th day of February A. D

M

1940, personally appeared before me Laura

L. H. Eskelson, the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that
she executed the same.
j Commission Expires 1
I

Oct. 30th, 1943

^^"^^

DeVan Eskelson

(( (&BAfi\ \

Notary Public
Residence* Kamas, Utah.

I Recorded March 20th, 1940 at 11*40 A. M.

Abstracted

Vtcs:
?&<£</,
X.jfi£t<fc
J@L
No. 73708

^//^

County Recorder

WARRANTY DEED
Alvin W, Hatch and Elizabeth J, Hatch, his wife, grantors, of Woods Cross,

County of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY AflP YfARRANT to Ancel Hatch, grantee? of
Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah, for the sua of ?EN ($10,$>P) DOLLARS, the following
described tract of land in — C o u n t y , State of Utahi
Commencing at a point 561 feet North from the Southeast corner of Section 22,
f Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U, 8. Survey 1 running thence West
231 feetj thenoe North 379,4 feetj thence East 231 feetj thence South 379.4 feet to
the place of commencement, containing 2.00 acres, more or leas.

\t>(L O
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duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
My commission expires;
Feb. 12, 1948

/^^^\

Frank Crpft

((fefiALJJ
^--x^

Recorded February/23, 1945 at 11:25 A.M.

Notary Public
Residing at Farmmgton, Utah
Abstracted /-///- tut
^ ^ ^ c ^ e ^ C County Recorder
?

No. 88811

SALE AGREEMENT

(

THIS AGREEMENT made at Salt Lake City, Utah this 1st day of November, 1944J,
between ANCEL HATCH and AMY A. HATCH, husband and wif«, residents of Woods Cross, «
Davis County, Utah, sellers, and WILLIAM GUFFEY and JOSEPHINE A. GUFfEY, his wife, \
residents of Yfoods Cross, Davis County, Utah, buyers, Y/ITNESSETH:

j

That the sellers hereby agree to sell and the buyers agree to buy upon the
t

terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, the following described real and personal
property owned by the sellers and located in Davis County, State of Utah, consist- \
ing of approximately 385.95 acres of land and the personal property hereinafter described, said real property is described as followa, to-wit:

1
i

Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 2 North, Range j
1 West, running thence North 376.2 feet} thence East 793.93 feet; thence South

{

914.1 feetj thence West 793-98 feet; thence North 573.9 feet to beginning, contain-^
ing 16.65 acres, more or less.
The East half of the Southwest quarter of section 22, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, containing 80 acres, more or less.

J
j
j

The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 2 «
i

North, Range 1 Y/est, containing 40.00 acres, more or less.

\

Beginning 180 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township {
2 North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rods; thence North 60 rods; thence j
East 160 rods; thence South 60 rods to beginning, containing 60 acres, more or less.
Beginning 130 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2
North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rods; thence North 50 rodsj thence
jj
East 160 rodsj thence South 50 rods to beginning, containing 50 acres, more or less.
Beginning 80 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2 t
North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rodsj thence North 50 rods; thence

j

;
j;

East 160 rods; thence South 50 rods to beginning, containing 50 acres, more or less.
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2 North, Range ;
j 1 West, running thence North 34 rods; thence West 14 rodsj thence North 46 rodsj

f

thence West 146 rodsj thence South 80 rodsj thence East 160 rods to beginning, con-J
i

taining 76 acres, more or less.

j

Commencing at a point 561 feet North from the Southeast corner of Section |
22,

Township 2 North, Range 1 West, running thence West 231 feet; thence North

i
I
379.4 feetj thence East 231 feetj thence South 379.4 feet to beginning,containing g
2.00 acres, more or less.
\
Commencing at a point 18.80 chains East from the Northwest corner of sec- J
tion 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, running thence South 8.15 chains, thence jj
East 8.77 chainsj thence North 5° West 8.20 chains; thence North 5.56 chainsj thence
North89°37» West 8.49 chains j thence South 5.63 chains to beginning, containing ij

11.30 acres, more or less,

I

also the following personal propertyi

All of the livestock including 37 head of

j

cows, calves and steers and 4 head of horses and all harnesses and farm implements ,'

j
upon the property including tractor, mower, and all other farm equipment now located
on said property above described.

!*

The total purchase price for said property, real and personal, is the sum ?
of $15,000.00 and said sum is payable to the sellers in the amounts and at the times•
n
as followsi #1,000.00 on the date hereof, the receipt of which is hereby acknow- .'
ledged, the balance, $14,000.00 to bear interest at the rate of 4$ per annum from f
the date hereof until paid, interest to cease on principal payments as oiadej

'

$4,000.00 together with the a-nnual interest to that date on or before 2 years from j
date and the balance of $10,000.00 payable $600.00 per year together with yearly
interest payments until the entire purchase price is paid.

•

\

The buyers shall have 1

the right to pay any amount or all of the balance of the purchase price at any time;
The purchasers agree to sell all the male cattle of said cattle purchased j
and to apply the sales price and pay the same to the sellers, the amount received

'
i

to be applied upon the balance of principal to be paid.
The sellers agree to furnish to the buyers abstract of title to the pro- i(
perty above described showing an uneracumbered fee simple marketable title in the

|>

sellers satisfactory to the attorneys of the buyers and to execute, sign and

r

acknowledge a deed to said property in favor of the buyers so that the same may be 1
delivered to the buyers at any time hereafter that the buyers shall have made full >
payment of the purchase price of the propertyThe sellers agree to pay the taxes on the property for the year 1944 and

j
|
i;

the buyers are to be entitled to and have taken possession of the property and
agree to pay the taxes thereafter on the property on or before the date when the

?
H
j

taxes may become delinquent.

{

8

'

\

It is agreed that if the sellers accept payments from the buyers on this *
c

contract less than according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing it

a
i

will in no way alter the terms of the contract and all payments made by the buyers,};
if any, in excess of the payments herein stipulated may at the option of the buyers«
be applied on future payments.

|

The buyers agree to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on the I
t

premises insured with a company acceptable to the seller in the amount of $2500.00 ?
and to assign said insurance to the sellers as their interest may appear.

'

In the event the buyers default in the payment of taxes or insurance as
provided herein or in the event that the buyers fail to pay a total of $5,000.00
on said purchase price on or before two years from date and the sellers make

•;

written demand upon the buyers to remedy their default in any of said particulars
and shall fail to remedy said default within 90 days after said written notice and J
demand, then, in that event, the sellers shall at their option be released from all"1
obligations to convey said property and all payment which have been made thereon
on this contract by the buyers shall be forfeited to the sellers as liquidated

I

damages for the non-performance of this contract.

\

The sellers on receiving the full purchase price to be paid as herein pro-!!
vided agree to deliver to the buyers a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying t
Jfee_ premAggj_J'?eel a n d clear of all encumbrances except as may_have accrued by or *

through the acts or neglect of the buyers and to furnish at their expense as afore-J
said an abstract or abstracts of title brought bo date of the delivery of the deed;,
the title to be marketable and acceptable to the buyers.
The buyers and sellers each agree that should they default in any of the

r

covenants and agreements contained herein to pay all costs and expenses tnat may *
arise from enforcing this agreement, either by suit or otherwise, including a

I
A

reasonable attorneys' fees.
5
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed
their names as of the 1st day of November, 1944*
WITNESS:

Ancel Hatch
Amy A Hatch
William Guffey
Josephine A. Guffey

Oscar W Moyle

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I
f
jj

I
: ss
J

j
)
j

On this 1st day of November, 194-4, personally appeared before me ANCCL

(

HATCH and AMY A. HATCH, husband and wife, the signers of the above instrument, who «
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
/^==^\

Commission Expires
Oct. 30, 1948

0s

jj

| (SEALJ JJ
^is-sss^

\

°ar Y/ Moyle
Notary Public

Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.
Abstracted at,, a A/- /*>

Recorded February 24, 1945 at 12s 25 P.M.

A3- Ay-/*/
_County Recorder

No. 88836

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

*
\

J

POLE LINE EASEMENT

?

i.

r
Benjamin Clegg and Cora Mae Clegg his wife, Grantors, of Davis County,

u

Utah, hereby convey and warrant to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its '
successors in Interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) ^Dollar and ^

>

/

'

other valuable consideration', a perpetual easement and right of way for (the erection

I

t

'

and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, and replacement of the electric

/

1

|

i

1

transmission, distribution and telephone circuits of the Grantee, and/L guy anchor J
and 2 poles, with the necessary guys, /stubs, crossarras and other attachments there-

/

/

/

\

on, or affixed thereto, for the support of said circuits, to be erected and maintained upon and/across the premises of the Grantors, In Davis Counjty, Utah, along
a line described as follows:
Beginning at existing pole! on grantor's land at a points 520 feet north and
1085 feet we^st, more or less, from/the east quarter corner of Section 27, T. 2 H., 1
together with all rights 5
R. 1 ¥/., S.L.B.& M., thence runnink N. 19°141 E. 858 feet to i"ence on north boundary

I

F

/

line of said land and being in the* BEi of NEi of Section Zll

\
\

'of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for,.
the full/and complete use, occupation and enjoyment of/the easement hereby granted/

/

T

/

and all rights and privileges incident thereto, including the right to cut and

\
,

remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches/and other obstructions which may *
injure or interfere with the Grantee's u^-e-^-o^ccupation, or enjoyment of this ease- \
ment.

\

